torsdag, april 08, 2010

FN-rapport: Sverige bas för somaliska jihadister

Säkerhetsrådet i FN har en särskild kommitté som övervakar utvecklingen i Somalia, Monitoring Group on Somalia. I den senaste rapporten (pdf), framlagd för säkerhetsrådet den 10 mars, pekas Sverige ut som en central plats för rekrytering, propaganda och stöd åt de islamistiska terrorgrupper som härjar det kaotiska afrikanska landet. Dessutom visas att svenska vapen används i det heliga kriget. Men Sverige är inte betydelsefullt enbart för jihadisterna - även pirater (!) och människosmugglare kopplas hit på grund av vår sårbarhet för bedrägerier i asylhanteringen.

Nedan presenteras några utdrag.

Rapporten konstaterar att det finns täta band mellan terrorgruppen Shabaab och den svensksomaliska diasporan, och exemplifierar med det besök i Göteborg som avlades av imamen Hassaan Hussein (alias Xasaan Xuseen) i somras.

Hassan Mahad Omar — better known to his audience as Sheikh Hassaan Hussein Adam and to his followers in Al-Shabaab as Abu Salmaan. Hassaan and his associates at the informal religious centre known as Masjid-ul-Axmar are not simply sympathizers of Al-Shabaab, but actually key figures in their outreach efforts to recruit new members and solicit funds.


Early in July 2009, Hassaan visited another hub of opposition support activity, Sweden, where he attended the seventeenth Somali Islamic Convention hosted by the Bellevue mosque in Gothenburg. Hassaan’s participation triggered demonstrations by Somalis in Sweden opposed to Al-Shabaab, but was defended by the mosque administration and conference organizers.
Men inte enbart Shabaab kopplas till mötet i Göteborg. Även den nyare islamistgruppen Hizbul Islam var representerad - av två svenska medborgare.
Another high-profile participant at the Somali Islamic Convention was Yasiin Baynah, Secretary-General of ARS-Asmara and a founding member of Hizbul Islam. Baynah and Omar Shukri, a close aide to Hassan Dahir Aweys, were among a group of Somalis arrested by the Swedish authorities in February 2008 on charges of terrorism financing, but subsequently released for lack of evidence. Baynah and Shukri both returned to Somalia where they played key roles in the establishment of Hizbul Islam.

Late in April 2009, Shukri reappeared in the company of Hassan Dahir Aweys whom he accompanied on his return trip from Asmara to Mogadishu (case study 1, in section II.A above). Meanwhile, Baynah continued to operate a successful travel agency in Stockholm specializing in transporting pilgrims to Mecca for the annual Hajj, but late in 2009 he was convicted by a Stockholm district court on charges of tax evasion, linked to the operation of an underground money transfer service.

The Monitoring Group has also learned that Hizbul Islam leaders, including Baynah, engaged in fund-raising for armed opposition groups on the sidelines of the Gothenburg conference.
I fotnoterna påpekas även att svensksomaliern Shukri fortfarande reser fritt mellan Somalia och Sverige.

Rapporten nämner också att Hassaan Hussein deltagit i ett internetseminarium i regi av den Göteborgsbaserade islamistsajten - tillsammans med den svenske medborgaren och Shabaab-ledaren Fuad Muhamed "Shongole" Khalaf (i rapporten titulerad "regional commander").
In April 2009, Hassaan headed a list of clerics invited to participate at an Internet discussion promoted by the Al-Shabaab-affiliated website and the Dacwatutawxiid online forum; the discussion also headlined Shabaab leaders Mukhtar Roobow and Fu’aad Shangole, as well as Hizbul Islam leaders Omar Imaan Abubakar and Abdullahi Ali Hashi.
Just vad gäller islamisternas propagandaaktiviteter betonas Sveriges roll extra tydligt. På listan över betydelsefulla internetsajter sätts svenska (som visar sig ha en svensk som åtalats för terrorbrott i England som moderator) högst.
The Internet continues to play an important role in propaganda, recruiting and fund-raising by Somali armed groups (see S/2008/769). The Monitoring Group has continued to watch and investigate some of the most salient websites and forums, which include:



The most active online Al-Shabaab outlet is, which was established in September 2007 as a forum for Golaha Ansaarta Mujaahidiinta (the Council of Supporters of the Mujahideen. Alqimmah not only disseminates Shabaab materials, but also participates in their production, making it an integral part of Al-Shabaab’s da’awa (propagation) apparatus.

On 22 July 2009, posted a 42-minute audio tape entitled Sharif Muslim, Sharif Murtad (Sharif the Muslim, Sharif the Apostate), for which it claims credit for writing and production. The recording casts President Sharif as the leader of a heretical regime, and AMISOM forces as infidel invaders, and urges listeners to support jihad against them. The propaganda section of Al-Shabaab subsequently claimed to have distributed this widely throughout Somalia.

Less than one month later, on 15 August 2009, alqimmah posted a link to a book entitled The Science of Explosions and Explosives written by a man by the name of Abu Hafs al-Lubnaani. The intention of the posting was apparently to make available to Shabaab supporters and sympathizers knowledge pertinent to bomb-making.

On 30 August 2009, alqimmah posted a 47-page religious ruling (fatwa) issued in Arabic by Sheikh Hassaan Hussein (see case study 2 above) against the outcome of the Djibouti peace process. The fatwa has provided the Somali Islamist groups in general and Al-Shabaab in particular with alleged religious justifications for waging a jihad against the Government of Somalia as an apostate regime.

On 20 January 2010, alqimmah posted a six-minute jihadist nasheed (religious song or chant) entitled Nairobi Tutafika46 by Al-Shabaab militants threatening to enter Kenya and march on Nairobi. In an introduction to the song, alqimmah stated that the song was motivated by the arrest three weeks earlier of the Jamaican preacher, Abdulla al-Faisal, in Nairobi, who was convicted and imprisoned in Britain for inciting racial hatred. Chanted in Swahili and interspersed with speeches and the sound of gunfire, the posting was apparently intended to incite and inspire greater militancy among Al-Shabaab supporters in Kenya.

The website is registered in Sweden in the name of Abdu-Raouf (Ralf) Wadman (also known as Usama el-Swede), a Swedish convert to Islam based in Gothenburg, who has been linked to a variety of extremist figures and causes. One of its administrators is Musa Said Yusuf “Godir”. On 28 May 2008, Godir was arrested in London, together with Ahmed Said Mohamed “Faarax-Deeq”, administrator of another Al-Shabaab-affiliated website, and charged with a variety of offences under British anti-terrorism legislation.

Both men were subsequently cleared of the charges and released. On the night of 28 July 2009, participants in an Al-Shabaab online forum celebrated the release of Faarax-Deeq and he briefly addressed the group. On 9 August 2009, a group of Somalis including members and supporters of ARS-Asmara hosted a reception for Faarax-Deeq and Godir in Leicester, United Kingdom. One objective of the party was to express gratitude to a “core team”, including ARS-Asmara spokesman Zakaria Mohamud Haji Abdi, for their efforts towards the release of two men.

Such “virtual” cooperation between armed opposition groups is not unusual. Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam have regularly conducted joint forums, achieving a greater degree of cooperation in cyberspace than they do on the ground. For example, a forum late in March 2009 included Sheikh Fu’ad Mohamed Khalaf (Al-Shabaab), Ma’allin Burhan (Al-Shabaab) and Abdullahi “Khadaab” Haji Yusuf (Secretary-General of Hizbul Islam). Likewise, a three-day, live fund-raising event late in May 2009 involved Abdullahi “Khadaab” (Hizbul Islam), Abdullahi Ali Hashi (Hizbul Islam) and Mukhtar Roobow (Al-Shabaab).

Al-Shabaab have also used such Internet forums to highlight their cooperation with the Muhaajirun — foreign fighters who have joined their struggle. During the second week of July 2009, for example, Fu’aad Shangole and Ma’allin Burhan related to participants of an online forum the proceedings of a ceremony held at the Salahudiin Islamic Centre to thank the foreigners and, reportedly, to celebrate the marriage of some 50 of them to Somali women as a way to integrate them into Somali society. The message was unmistakably to assure potential foreign volunteers that they could expect a similarly warm welcome if they joined the cause.
Internet används självfallet av islamisterna för att rekrytera jihadister, bland annat från Sverige och Danmark.
Internet activism and diaspora support networks are also used for recruitment purposes. Over the course of the Monitoring Group’s mandate, international attention was especially drawn to the recruitment of young men and women of Somali origin from Western countries into the rank and file of Al-Shabaab — some of whom were subsequently deployed as suicide bombers. Other cases involved the inspiration or incitement to conduct terrorist activities on foreign soil.


On 3 December 2009, an ethnic Somali from Denmark detonated an explosive vest while taking part at a graduation ceremony for medical students from Banaadir University. The bomb killed 24 people, mainly students. The other fatalities included two doctors, three journalists and four ministers of the Transitional Federal Government. Approximately 60 people were reported injured. Although the spokesman for Al-Shabaab, Ali Mohamud Raghe, publicly denied responsibility for the blast, the Monitoring Group has listened to online forums at which Shabaab leaders have claimed the suicide attack as a victory, and informed participants that the bomber’s wife, who is also trained for suicide operations, was held back at the last moment due to pregnancy, but for a future opportunity.

The Government of Sweden estimates that at least 20 Swedes of Somali origin have joined armed opposition groups. One of them, Shu’ayb Ali Hassan, from the Stockholm suburb of Rinkeby, was initially recruited into the Anoole faction of Hizbul Islam, he reportedly requested a transfer to Al-Shabaab, where there were more young people from the diaspora for him to socialize with. He was killed on 2 July 2009 while fighting for Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu.
Rapporten noterar oroat också att element i den somaliska diasporan, bland annat i Skandinavien, visar tecken på att gå från stödfunktioner till direkt aktion, och att den tendensen kommer att stärkas då Shabaab aktivt strävar efter att föra konflikten utanför Somalias gränser.
During the course of 2009, there were indications that some of Al-Shabaab’s
supporters in the diaspora were beginning to take an interest not only in support but
also in operations.


In Sweden, a cartoonist reportedly received threatening telephone calls from a Swedish-speaking man calling from Somalia.


On 1 January 2010, another Somali with alleged ties to Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaida East Africa was shot and arrested in Denmark in connection with an attack on a Danish cartoonist; the same man had reportedly been detained in Kenya because police suspected that he was planning an attack on a visiting delegation headed by the United States Secretary of State.

The Monitoring Group believes that this trend will continue in the near future, as Al-Shabaab frustration with the ongoing stalemate — or possible political and military reverses — induce them to externalize the conflict and strike at perceived backers of the Transitional Federal Government, Puntland or Somaliland.
FN-rapporten påvisar också hur rekryteringen till terrornätverken följer vissa klanmönster, vilket understryker vikten av klankännedom i diasporan.
Although Somalis from a wide variety of clans have been recruited in this way, there is little doubt that recruiters are taking advantage of kinship in order to identify prospective recruits, win their trust and exploit community solidarity to escape the attention of the authorities.

In Minneapolis, for example, Monitoring Group investigations indicate that more than half of the 20 young people known to be missing had at least one parent from the Harti sub-clan of the Daarood. Three of the five Somali Minnesotans killed while fighting for Al-Shabaab belonged to the Omar Mohamud sub-clan of the Harti/Majeerteen, and the fourth’s mother was also from the Harti. In Sweden, Shu’ayb Ali Hassan, himself a member of the Rahanweyne clan, was initially recruited into a Harti fighting force by maternal relatives from the Siwaaqroon sub-clan of the Harti/Majeerteen.
De somaliska terroristernas förgreningar i Europa grundas till stor del på bedrägerier i asylförfarandet, konstaterar rapporten. Sverige släpper lättvindigt in både jihadister, människosmugglare - och pirater!
The activities of Somali armed groups beyond Somalia’s borders are facilitated by the widespread practice of immigration fraud. The Monitoring Group has learned that members of Al-Shabaab, Hizbul Islam and pirate militias have taken advantage of this practice in order to gain entry into various European countries, and probably several destinations in North America and Asia also.


Many Somali emigrants use Italy only as a gateway to Europe, settling in third countries. Although costs may vary, the average fee for a visa to Italy is reportedly from $12,000 to $13,000 for a man and $15,000 for a woman. Payment is put in an escrow account with a money transfer organization until the client arrives at his or her destination in Rome. The proceeds are roughly evenly shared between the broker and concerned embassy officials. Upon the client’s arrival in Italy, a secondary smuggling network takes over, often providing a falsified Italian residence document (for an additional $3,000) and arranging onward travel to another European country: cases investigated by the Monitoring Group suggested Sweden as a popular destination.


One of the most prominent “brokers” is a Somali member of parliament and former member of the African Union Parliament named Abdiaziz Abdullahi Mohamed “Abdi-hukun”. A Kenyan resident since 1997 and Somali member of parliament since 2004, Abdiaziz possesses an African Union passport, despite having lost his seat in the African Union Parliament more than five years ago, as well as a Swedish travel document. Together with another Swedish Somali resident, formerly based in Kismaayo with Al-Shabaab, Abdiaziz facilitates the movement through Kenya of Somali diaspora youth seeking to join Somali armed opposition groups.

In April 2009, Abdiaziz requested visas from the Italian Embassy for two members of his family. The visas were issued and the men travelled to Milan, but subsequently left Italy with fraudulent papers for a third country. Monitoring Group investigations offer grounds to believe that both men were in fact members of an armed opposition group — allegedly Al-Shabaab.

The Monitoring Group has learned of several other cases in which members of armed opposition groups have obtained visas to Europe on fraudulent grounds, including at least one member of Al-Shabaab and seven members of Hizbul Islam. In addition, a Hizbul Islam commander relocated his family to Sweden in mid-2009, and could potentially join them at some future time under a family reunification programme. The Al-Shabaab figure reportedly facilitated the movement of foreign fighters out of Somalia early in 2007, after the Ethiopian intervention, and has since settled in Sweden.

Pirates have also exploited immigration fraud. The Monitoring Group is aware of several members of a Puntland-based pirate militia who obtained asylum and travel documents in Europe during the course of 2009. One obtained asylum in Sweden, one travelled via Italy to the Netherlands and one reportedly obtained entry into the United Kingdom. All three subsequently returned to the region to resume their involvement with pirate militias.
FN-kommitténs rapport beskriver också de vapen som jihadisterna strider med. En typ, granatgeväret Carl Gustav, kommer från Sverige.
The following picture, taken during a military parade on 1 January 2009, shows an insurgent equipped with a Carl Gustav M2.

FN-rapporten borde leda till frågor och självkritik i Sverige. Vad kan Sverige göra för att hindra Shabaab, som de facto är en gren av al Qaida, från att ha sin propagandagren baserad i Sverige? Hur kan Migrationsverket och Säkerhetspolisen förbättra sina kontroller av inresande, så att pirater, terrorister och människosmugglare inte ska kunna få svenska uppehållstillstnd och resehandlingar? Och vad kan den svensksomaliska diasporan göra, och vilken hjälp behöver den, för att jihadismen inte ska bli ännu mera utbredd här?