Fritt fram för terrorismfinansiering
Al Aqsa spannmål friades även i hovrätten, skriver Sydsvenska Dagbladet som också citerar ur domskälen:
Åklagaren resonemang är att det är förbjudet att stödja Hamas, oavsett om man inte har för avsikt att stödja just organisationens militära gren. Det eftersom EU 2003 har beslutat om sanktioner mot hela Hamas.Därmed får man anta att vägens ände är nådd när det gäller att stoppa dem som under täckordet välgörenhet skickar pengar till rörelser som Hizbollah, Hamas, Shabab, talibanerna eller andra organisationer som bedriver en kombination av social verksamhet och terror.
Hamas är dock inte formell mottagare av pengarna som samlats in i Sverige. Ordföranden Khalid Al Yousef har hela tiden hävdat att pengarna så långt han kunnat kontrollera, gått till lagliga humanitära organisationer.
Åklagarens försök att bevisa att dessa organisationer bara varit en täckmantel för Hamas underkänner hovrätten.
"Även om utredningen kan sägs tala för att de utpekade organisationerna haft någon form av anknytning till Hamas finner hovrätten [...] att det inte är ställt utom rimligt tvivel att organisationerna i fråga vid de här aktuella överföringstillfällena haft en sådan nära koppling till Hamas som i objektivt hänseende krävs för att brott mot sanktionslagen ska föreligga."
Hovrätten skriver att Hamas inte varit ensamma om att bedriva social verksamhet i de palestinska områdena.
"Det förhållande att Hamas ägnade sig åt hjälpverksamhet betyder därför inte att de utpekade organisationerna måste ha haft band till Hamas. I övrigt utgör den av åklagaren åberopade bevisningen främst indicier för att organisationerna i fråga hade någon form av koppling till Hamas. Det rör sig främst om att personer i ledande ställning inom Hamas haft framträdande positioner i de mottagande organisationerna, att organisationerna i fråga pekats ut som Hamasorganisationer under Philadelphiamötet och av representanter för den Palestinska myndigheten samt att organisationerna i några fall förbjudits av Israelsiska myndigheter på grund av samröre med Hamas."
Men hovrätten talar om en "grundläggande brist" med åklagarens uppgifter - att de är gamla. Enligt rätten har ingen utredning presenterats om hur organisationerna var organiserade när Malmöstiftelsen skickade pengarna.
"Detta gör det omöjligt att värdera betydelsen tex av att enskilda personer samtidigt har koppling till Hamas och till någon av de i åtalet nämna hjälporganisationerna."
Al Aqsa spannmål har sitt kontor på Nobelvägen i Malmö. Åtalet har gällt sammanlagt 1 234 955 kronor som samlats in mellan 2002 och 2007, främst från palestinier boende i Sverige. Pengarna har i huvudsak gått till fyra organisationer: Islamic Society i Quarana, Human Appeal, Wamy samt Jenin Charity Committee.
Uppdatering:
I våras, efter tingsrättsdomen, skrev Michael Jonsson och Christian Nils Larson "Scandinavian Trials Demonstrate Difficulty of Obtaining Terrorist Financing Convictions", för Jamestown Foundations Terrorism monitor.
Khalid al-Yousef, head of al-Aqsa Spannmål Stiftelse (al-Aqsa Grain Foundation) in Malmö, Sweden, was brought to court on charges of terrorist financing and breaking EU sanctions prohibiting support to Hamas. Al-Yousef agreed that he had collected money and transferred it to charities in Palestine including the Jenin Charity Committee, the Islamic Society, WYMA, and Human Appeal, but he denied that the recipient organizations were part of Hamas or that the purpose was to finance terrorism. [1]
The crux of the prosecution’s argument was that money sent from al-Aqsa Spannmål Stiftelse to charities in Gaza may have been used to support the families of deceased terrorists, thus encouraging terrorism. The court dismissed the charge, however, because Swedish law does not explicitly prohibit such support. On the charge of breaking EU sanctions, the court found that the total evidence put forth “to some extent indicates that one or more of the organizations to which Khalid al-Yousef has sent money may be a part of Hamas, and the transaction thus prohibited. The evidence presented, however, is not sufficient for a conviction.”[2]
The court’s verdict followed a tough evaluation of the evidence presented. The court said that because Israel and Hamas are engaged in a “war-like situation,” the Israeli view of Hamas as a terrorist organization and the outlawing of the charities in question “should be regarded as entirely irrelevant.” [3] The court also rejected documents seized by Israeli authorities in Hebron in June 2002 that allegedly show that Hamas’ social, political, and military activities are all related. Because the documents’ authenticity could not be verified, they had “very little or no value” as evidence. Lastly, the court said that evidence from two trials by an Israeli court in Samaria “cannot be given any decisive importance” because of the “war-like situation” in Israel and Palestine, as the trials were conducted on occupied territory and the original documents were not presented. [4]
Citing various concerns, the Swedish court largely discarded as evidence an FBI wiretap of a 1993 meeting of Hamas operatives in Philadelphia, a statement from the PLO, and a letter from the late Shaykh Ahmad Yassin (the spiritual leader of Hamas) that had been used in a German trial. The evidence the court found to be most credible was wiretaps indicating that al-Aqsa supported the families of martyrs and Hamas activists, and that money sent to Human Appeal may have been forwarded to other charities.
In an interview with Sydsvenska Dagbladet, Judge Rolf Håkansson reiterated the court’s view that the evidence presented had been inadequate: “Can you base a conviction on newspaper articles, TV clips, and excerpts from books?” (Sydsvenska Dagbladet, February 18). Prosecutor Agneta Qvarnström stated that although there was perhaps no single piece of evidence sufficient on its own for a conviction, she believed that the total picture presented by the circumstantial evidence was quite convincing.
Especially interesting in terms of the alleged sanctions law violation is the court’s argument that while a wiretap suggests that al-Aqsa Spannmål Stiftelse “supports the families of martyrs… this does not show that there is an economic connection” to Hamas. It appears that the court has not considered the fungibility aspect whereby support given to the families of “martyrs” or Hamas members may free up Hamas’ funds for other purposes. This argument assumes that Hamas would fund the families of “martyrs” if charities were not doing so. Many terrorist groups have consistently supported the families of killed or incarcerated members. An interesting state example is Saddam Hussein’s history of funding the families of Palestinian “martyrs” and the significant support he won in Palestine as a result (BBC, March 13, 2003).
[...]
These cases illustrate the complexities of prosecuting cases of suspected terrorist financing through charities and the specific challenges created by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At a basic level there is an unenviable policy trade-off between the imperatives of permitting humanitarian aid and preventing terrorist financing. The situation is exacerbated by the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories and Hamas’ abuse of charities. The cases at hand have been particularly difficult to prosecute, in part due to Hamas’ semi-official standing and widespread support in Gaza. Against this background, both the Swedish and Danish courts argued that the presence of acknowledged Hamas members in a specific charity does not prove that the charity is “part” of Hamas. Such an argument is more difficult to make in countries or regions where only a very small percentage of the population sympathizes with a terrorist group. It is telling that even large government agencies have had trouble ensuring that public funds do not make their way to Hamas. [13]
The trials also show that the way Israeli evidence is evaluated can be central to the final outcome of a case. The importance of Israeli evidence underlines the challenges small countries like Sweden and Denmark face in gathering evidence in terrorist financing cases without the cooperation of government authorities in the recipient/target countries.
The trials of al-Aqsa in Sweden and Denmark demonstrate that the evidentiary threshold for criminal procedures in sanctions cases is very high in those countries. Individuals set on circumventing those laws may find it easier to create plausible deniability in their efforts. In Germany and the Netherlands, administrative bans have enjoyed some success, but the legality of these measures has come up against repeated legal challenges.
Efforts to combat terrorist financing appear to have come full circle, from the silent monitoring and intelligence-gathering exercised pre-9/11 by the U.S. and advocated by Germany in 2002, to the vigorous use of civil and criminal procedures to try to halt the transmission of funds to terrorist organizations. In several countries, however, the judicial challenges of obtaining convictions in terrorist financing cases seem to be swinging the pendulum back towards silent intelligence gathering. The al-Aqsa cases in Sweden and Denmark may further this trend.
